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1 Introduction
Policy makers across the globe want to foster their entrepreneurial ecosystems. Silicon Val-
ley seems to be the envy of everyone, imitations abound: Silicon Forest (Oregon), Swamp
(Florida), Gorge (UK), Glen (Scotland), Fjord (Norway), Wadi (Israel), Savannah (Kenya),
and many more. The core reasons why policy makers want to promote entrepreneurship are
fairly well understood, they relate mainly to economic growth, employment, and innovation
(see Lerner (2008), Decker et al. (2014),Wilson (2015)). However, there are vast disparities
in the approaches taken by governments to achieve these goals. The questions becomes how
policy makers can foster entrepreneurship?
One common set of approaches focuses on expediting founding, facilitating entry into en-
trepreneurship, and promoting firm formation. Such policies come in a wide variety of forms,
such as training, access to mentoring and expertise, or a reduction of bureaucratic red tape. In
the US, the Small Business Administration (SBA) offers a large variety of training programs for
entrepreneurs, and the I-Corps program of the National Science Foundation (NSF) provides en-
trepreneurship training for scientists and engineers.1 The website of the UK government alone
lists over 250 business support programs for entrepreneurs.2 McKenzie and Woodruff (2014)
summarize various studies on business support programs for entrepreneurs in developing coun-
tries.
A very different set of policies focuses on supporting the funding of entrepreneurial ven-
tures. These policies use a variety of methods to encourage investors to channel more funding
into start-ups. In the US, the SBIC program supports the funding of early-stage start-ups. Ac-
cording to the Angel Capital Association, more than half of all US states have some tax credits
for angel investing.3 In the UK angel investors receive generous tax credits under the EIS/SEIS
program.4 New Zealand has a government fund that matches private angel investments.5 Wil-
son and Silva (2013) provide a comprehensive discussion of government policies for early-stage
funding across the OECD.
Applied policy analysis typically focuses on evaluating the effectiveness of specific pro-
grams in isolation. There is limited emphasis on contrasting policies, and asking what type of
policies would be most effective. We therefore raise the fundamental question of how differ-
1See https://www.sba.gov/starting-managing-business and https://www.nsf.gov/news/special_reports/i-corps/
2https://www.gov.uk/business-finance-support-finder/search?support_types%5B%5D=expertise-and-
advice&postcode=&business_sizes=&sectors=&stages=
3See https://www.sba.gov/sbic and https://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/aca-public-policy-state-program-
details/
4https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-enterprise-investment-scheme-introduction
5See http://www.nzvif.co.nz/what-we-offer/seed-co-investment-fund and
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ent entrepreneurship policies compare in terms of their impact on entrepreneurial ecosystems.
We tackle this question with a formal theory model that derives and contrasts the equilibrium
impact of different government policies. Specifically we ask how different policies promote
entrepreneurial activity, distinguishing between (i) founding policies that affect what is often
called the ‘demand-side’, i.e., the number of entrepreneurs demanding capital, versus (ii) fund-
ing policies that affect the supply of funds to new ventures.
Based on a large prior entrepreneurial finance literature (see Da Rin et al. (2013)), we ac-
knowledge that the financing of entrepreneurial ventures requires ‘smart money’. Specifically
it requires tacit knowledge about the entrepreneurial process that is mostly acquired by going
through the entrepreneurial process itself. We view so-called ‘angel’ investing as the natural
process by which experienced entrepreneurs pass on their knowledge to the next generation of
entrepreneurs. In practice, the first check of successful start-ups often comes from angel in-
vestors who were successful entrepreneurs before: think of Andy Bechtolsheim, co-founder of
Sun Microsystems, who wrote the first check for Google, or Peter Thiel, co-founder of PayPal,
who wrote the first check for Facebook. In fact, over 70% of all angels investing in Silicon Val-
ley on AngelList, the leading US angel investment portal, have prior entrepreneurial experience
(we discuss this more thoroughly in Section 3.1).
The importance of angel investors for the financing of early-stage ventures has also been
established in the recent academic literature. Wilson (2011) estimates the total (visible and
invisible) size of angel investments, and finds that the total amounts are approximately of the
same order of magnitude as the total amounts invested in venture capital. Given that angel
investments are much smaller, this means that many more start-ups receive angel financing
than venture capital. Kerr et al. (2014) obtain data from US angel groups. Using a regression
discontinuity approach, they identify the effect of angel investments on company performance.
They find that angel investments lead to higher survival rates, better exits, more employment
creation, higher patenting, and increased Web traffic. Lerner et al. (2018) expand that regression
discontinuity approach to international data. They find evidence that is broadly consistent with
Kerr et al. (2014), and also show that angel funding leads to more follow-on funding, such as
from venture capitalists.
We use an ‘overlapping generations’ model to account for the accumulation of expertise
in an entrepreneurial ecosystem. Early in their career entrepreneurs start new ventures that
may succeed or fail. Successful entrepreneurs accumulate both the expertise and the wealth
to then fund the next generation of entrepreneurs. This creates dynamic interlinkages between
generations of entrepreneurs, where the supply of angel capital is a function of the number of
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past entrepreneurs and the wealth they accumulated.6 An important assumption is that angels
are constrained in how much capital (beyond their own savings) they can leverage. This limits
how much angels are able to pass on their skills and experiences to the next generation of
entrepreneurs, and thus puts an upper bound on the availability of smart money in the ecosystem.
Promoting entrepreneurship is not a short-term endeavor. Silicon Valley took decades to
become what it is today; its imitators had to learn how long it takes to create an entrepreneurial
ecosystem (Lerner, 2008). Our dynamic model allows us to examine both the short-term and
the long-term impacts of entrepreneurial policies. We first build a simple Walrasian model of
the demand and supply for capital to fund new ventures, without any intergenerational linkages.
We establish several important benchmark results. Comparable levels of founding and funding
subsidies generate the same increase in entrepreneurial activity. However, founding policies
create a competitive dynamic where more entrepreneurs seek a limited supply of funds, resulting
in less favorable investment terms for entrepreneurs, i.e., lower valuations. By contrast, funding
policies create a more abundant supply of capital which results in more favorable investment
terms for entrepreneurs, i.e. higher valuations.
Next we introduce intergenerational linkages and show that the differences in valuations
have important dynamic implications. This is because the wealth created by one generation of
entrepreneurs determines the supply of angel capital for the next generation of entrepreneurs.
One central result is that funding subsidies are more effective than founding subsidies for
increasing entrepreneurial activity. A key intuition is that a founding subsidy reduces en-
trepreneurs’ (nonmonetary) investment upfront, but also generates smaller (monetary) returns
in case of success. Put differently, with a funding subsidy entrepreneurs have more “skin in the
game”, which in case of success results in higher returns that can be reinvested in new ventures.
Our model generates some interesting predictions about the dynamic path of entrepreneurial
ecosystems. While there is always a unique equilibrium in every period, the model with inter-
generational linkages can have multiple steady state equilibria (to which the period equilibria
converge to). In the low (high) steady state equilibrium the lack (abundance) of entrepreneurial
activity prevents (enables) the formation of angel capital for future generations, thus perpetuat-
ing the low (high) level of entrepreneurial activity. We show that even in the high steady state
equilibrium there is too little entrepreneurial activity relative to the first best outcome. This is
because future entrepreneurs benefit from the wealth of earlier generations, but this intergener-
6The following quote from Frédéric Mazzella, founder of BlaBlaCar (France’s first start-up to achieve unicorn
status) illustrates this core mechanism: “When you are an angel investor your value is not necessarily in the money
but more in the access and experience you can provide to the inexperienced entrepreneur [...] I think it’s important
as a successful founder to re-invest in companies when you can, because it allows better knowledge transfer to the
next generation.” (Atomico, 2016, p. 59)
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ational externality is not taken into account by current investors. In the low equilibrium there
is an additional rationale for government support, namely to provide temporary subsidies to lift
the ecosystem above a critical threshold, beyond which there is a self-sustaining dynamic path
toward the high equilibrium.
In our model funding subsidies are the optimal policy, but they can be implemented in
several ways. One of them is to subsidize investments (such as an investment tax credit), another
is to subsidize returns (such as a relief from capital gains taxation). Across several model
extensions we find that the main results about the relative benefit of funding over founding
policies continues to hold. However, we note that beyond the formal model, there may be
reasons why founding policies may sometimes be preferable, such as if they are cheaper for the
government to implement.
We extensively discuss the implications from our model for entrepreneurship policies, look-
ing first at how policies affect a single ecosystem in isolation, and then looking at ‘open ecosys-
tem’ issues that allow for capital mobility across ecosystems. We also provide an extensive
discussion of how our analysis can guide future theoretical and empirical work.
Our paper relates to a diverse set of prior literatures. There is a large literature discussing
differences in entrepreneurship across ecosystems, starting with the seminal work by Saxenian
(1994); Lerner and Schoar (2010) contains a more recent overview. In terms of theory, the
closest work are formal entrepreneurship theories with multiple equilibria, such as Canidio and
Legros (2015) and Landier (2006). In terms of theories that examine how government policies
affect entrepreneurs and investors, seminal contributions include Poterba (1989a, 1989b), and
the work of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003, 2004). More recent contributions include Di Maio
et al. (2016) and Egger and Keuschnigg (2015). None of these paper focus on the comparison
of founding versus funding policies.7
A large prior literature looks at the dynamics of entrepreneurship. One important strand
looks at the origin of entrepreneurial activities in terms of spin-offs from established compa-
nies. Relevant theories include Cassiman and Ueda (2006), Hellmann and Perotti (2011), and
Rauch (2015). Important empirical works include Agarwal et al. (2004), Gompers et al. (2005),
and Klepper and Sleeper (2005). Another strand looks at the role of serial entrepreneurs, includ-
ing the work of Hsu (2007), Gompers et al. (2010), and Lafontaine and Shaw (2016). Axelson
and Martinovic (2015) suggest that differences in the experience of entrepreneurs and investors
can explain most of the differences in venture capital between Europe and the US. Our dynamic
analysis also bears some resemblance to the dynamic innovation literature, such as the seminal
7In this context it is also worth mentioning a recent paper by Färnstrand Damsgaard et al. (2016), who provide
both a theory and then some empirical evidence about a trade-off between R&D versus commercialization policies.
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work by Green and Scotchmer (1995), that looks at sequential innovation, or the work by Arora
et al. (2017), Gans (2017), and Segal and Whinston (2007), that looks at dynamic interactions
between entrants and incumbents. Our specific interest here is a slightly different dynamic tran-
sition that has received less attention, namely the transition from entrepreneur to angel investor.
The recent empirical explorations of Guiso et al. (2015) and Cumming et al. (2016) are a useful
step in that direction. As a background, the work of Van Osnabrugge and Robinson (2000) and
Wilson (2011) provide useful overviews of angel investing.
There is a growing policy literature on the merits of entrepreneurship policies. Lerner (2008)
and Audretsch et al. (2007) provide extensive coverage of this topic, including a discussion of
the pitfalls of misguided policies. Wilson and Silva (2013) and Wilson (2015) summarize a
large body of research about the experience of OECD countries with entrepreneurship policies.
The work of Leleux and Surlemont (2003) and Brander et al. (2015) empirically evaluates
one important class of funding programs, namely government-supported venture capital. Our
paper is also related to the broader literature on innovation and agglomeration, see Delgado et
al. (2010), Ellison et al. (2010), and Glaeser et al. (2010), as well as the descriptive work of
Startup Genome (2017).
Last but not least, our model suggests a societal benefit to having wealthy entrepreneurs,
and a benefit of giving tax credits to ‘already-rich’ angel investors. At first sight this argument
runs contrary to Piketty’s (2014) warning about wealth inequality. However, our model does not
suggest a blanket tax-exemption for the rich. Instead our argument is to create effective channels
for rich entrepreneurs to reinvest their wealth (and their expertise) into the next generation of
poor entrepreneurs. As such our argument focuses on creating a channel for social mobility.
This argument is related to the recent work of Aghion et al. (2015) concerning the broader
relationship between innovation and top income inequality.
We explain our theory in Section 2. Section 3 provides an extensive discussion of the impli-
cations of the model. It is followed by a brief conclusion. All proofs are in the Online Appendix,
which is available on the authors’ websites.
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2 Main Model
2.1 Base Assumptions
Consider an overlapping generations model where all parties are risk-neutral.8 In each period
t there is a continuous unit mass of potential entrepreneurs that are considering starting a new
venture. Entrepreneurs have no initial wealth and face a non-monetary entry cost denoted by l
(see Jovanovic (1982)). For simplicity assume that l has a uniform distribution over the interval
[0, 1].9 The number of entrepreneurs actually starting a venture in period t is a continuous
measure denoted by nE,t; whenever possible we simply write nE .
Each entrepreneur lives for three periods. In period 1, she starts a new ventures; we describe
the main properties below. If the venture is successful, the entrepreneur has some wealth that
she can invest in period 2. In period 3 she consumes the returns of all her investments.10
In period 1 the entrepreneur observes a business opportunity, and requires a fixed amount
φ > 0 to start a venture. The project is good with probability γ, and bad with probability 1− γ.
A good project succeeds with probability ρ, generating a payoff y > 0, and fails with probability
1− ρ, generating a zero payoff. A bad project always fails and generates a zero payoff. In case
of failure the entrepreneur has no more wealth, and plays no further role in the model. Ex-ante
the entrepreneur does not know the quality of the project. In the absence of any signal about
the project quality, the expected return from the venture is negative (formally γρy − φ < 0).
This implies that any general investors without a quality signal would loose money on average.
Financing therefore requires some type of ‘smart’ investors.11.
We use the simplest possible model of smart investors where are two types of investors.
Smart investors have the ability to observe whether the project is good or bad. Other ‘not-so-
smart’ investors cannot distinguish good from bad projects, and therefore refrain from investing
altogether. Amongst themselves, smart investors can pool their money, a process commonly
known as syndication. For simplicity the base model does not allow ‘not-so-smart’ investors to
8In the Online Appendix we use a general time discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. However, in order to simplify the
exposition in the main text we set δ = 1. Nothing depends on this simplification.
9In the Online Appendix we allow for a general uniform distribution over the interval [0, µE ]. However, to
simplify the exposition in the main text we conveniently assume µE = 1. Nothing depends on this assumption.
10We relax this time structure in Section3.2 which looks at the possibility that angels and entrepreneurs operate
over multiple periods.
11It is straightforward to extend the model by allowing for imperfect screening. Suppose, for example, that each
angel gets a public binary signal about the quality of a given project. If the underlying project is good, the signal
is always good, but if the underlying project is bad, then the smart investor gets a negative signal with probability
χ, and a positive signal with probability 1 − χ. In case all smart investors receive the same signal, i.e., their
signals are perfectly correlated, we can simply write the success probability of a project with a positive signal as
ρ = γγ+(1−γ)(1−χ) .
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join smart syndicates, but Section 3.1 shows that this assumption is easily relaxed. We call the
market for funding the ‘angel market’. For simplicity we assume perfectly competitive pricing.
A syndicate of investors receives an equity stake α in return for providing the capital φ.
In our base model we assume that only those angel investors who were formerly successful
entrepreneurs (period 1) can observe the quality of a project (smart investors). The number
of investors who have both the funds and the skills to invest in new ventures is thus given by
γρnE,t−1. The wealth of these investors is endogenously determined by their ownership in their
prior entrepreneurial ventures, and therefore given by (1− αt−1)y.
In period 2 a formerly successful entrepreneur can invest her wealth (1− αt−1)y. First, we
assume there is a safe asset that generates a safe return of 1.12 Second, there is the possibility
of investing in the next generation of entrepreneurs. We call an investor an angel whenever
the investor chooses to invest in an entrepreneurial venture. We denote the amount of angel
investing by k so that an investor invests k ∈ [0, (1 − αt−1)y] in new ventures, and invests the
remaining (1 − αt−1)y − k in the safe asset. We assume that angel investing involves some
private costs. These can be thought of as legal and due diligence costs, the opportunity cost
of time, and the personal preferences for engaging in angel investing. Specifically we assume
that each successful entrepreneur has a monetary cost θk of making angel investments, where
θ is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1].13 For our base model we use a
proportional cost specification, but all of the results of the base model continue to hold if instead
we assumed a fixed cost of making angel investments.14
Central to our argument is that angel investing requires special skills that cannot be taken for
granted in an ecosystem.15 The most natural source for acquiring such skills is to go through the
entrepreneurial experience itself, and then use the experience, as well as the acquired wealth,
to fund the next generation of entrepreneurs. Note that it is the combination of entrepreneurial
experience and wealth that creates entrepreneurial angels. Unsuccessful entrepreneurs may or
may not have useful skills, but they lack the wealth to become angel investors in this model.
12As mentioned above, the Online Appendix uses a time discount factor of δ. The safe asset then generates the
return 1 + r, where r =
1− δ
δ
.
13In the Online Appendix we allow for a general uniform distribution over the interval [0, µI ]. Again, to simplify
the exposition in the main text we set µI = 1. Nothing depends on this assumption.
14In a proportional cost model, we associate investor costs with some costs of allocating funds to risky angel
investments. In a fixed cost model we associate investor costs with some costs of setting up the overall angel
portfolio. A priori we do not have a strong opinion which one is more relevant, and in fact we might expect
them to coexist in reality. The reason why we use a proportional cost specification is that it generates simpler
mathematical expressions. The proofs for the model with fixed costs are available from the authors upon request.
15As a stylistic note, we use the term ‘ecosystem’ where many economists might use the term ‘economy’. The
meanings are very close, although the term ‘ecosystem’ is meant to clarify that entrepreneurship is only one part
of the overall economy.
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In our base model we only consider entrepreneurial angels who succeeded within the same
ecosystem. This allows us to focus on the endogenous determination of an angel market. In
Section 3.3 we also allow for external angels from other entrepreneurial ecosystems (such as
Silicon Valley).
2.2 Benchmark Model Without Intergenerational Dynamics
As a building block it is useful to consider a model without intergenerational dynamics, i.e.,
without entrepreneurial angels. For this we temporarily assume that the number of smart angels
is exogenously given by n˜, and their individual wealth is exogenously given by w˜.
Consider the optimal investment decision of investors. In exchange for investing the amount
φ in a venture with a good project, investors receive an ownership stake α, which generates the
expected return ραy. From the perspective of an individual investor this means that investing
the amount k in good ventures generates an expected return of k
φ
αρy. The remaining wealth
w˜− k can then be invested in the safe asset, generating a unit return. The expected utility of an
investor is thus given by
UI(k) =
k
φ
αρy − θk + (w˜ − k) .
We note that UI(k) is linear in k, so there exists a critical investment cost θ̂, such that for
θ ≤ θ̂ it is optimal for the investor to invest the entire wealth in new ventures (k∗ = w˜), and for
θ > θ̂ it is optimal to invest the entire wealth in the safe asset (k∗ = 0). The threshold is given
by θ̂ = αρy
φ
− 1, which is an increasing function of the ownership share α, and the venture’s net
economic return ρy
φ
. The aggregate supply of angel capital is thus given by θ̂n˜w˜.
Now consider the demand for capital from entrepreneurs that are entering the market. An
entrepreneur’s expected utility of starting a venture (with unknown project quality) is given by
UE = γρ(1− α)y. This has to be traded off against the cost of entry l. Clearly, entry is optimal
as long as UE ≥ l, so that the number of entrepreneurs (which is a continuous measure) is given
by
nE = UE = γρ(1− α)y. (1)
We call this the entry condition.
The total amount of capital that all entrepreneurs with good projects demand is given by
γnEφ (smart angels do not invest in bad projects). In equilibrium this must be equal to the total
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Figure 1: Benchmark Model – Market Equilibrium
capital supply, so that γnEφ = θ̂n˜w˜. Using the entry condition (1) and the definition of the
critical investment cost θ̂, we can write the market clearing condition as
γ2ρ(1− α)yφ =
(
α
ρy
φ
− 1
)
n˜w˜. (2)
This defines the equilibrium equity stake for investors, α∗, with α∗ ∈
[
φ
ρy
, 1
]
. The market
equilibrium {n∗E(α∗), α∗} is therefore fully characterized by the entry condition (1) and the
market clearing condition (2).16
Consider Figure 1. On the vertical axis we put α, a measure of investor ownership and thus
the effective price of capital. On the horizontal axis we put nE , the relevant quantity variable,
namely the number entrepreneurs seeking financing for their projects. The demand curve is
downward sloping, because fewer entrepreneurs want to enter with a higher price of capital
(i.e., higher α). The supply curve is upward sloping, because more investors want to invest in
the angel market when the net returns are higher.17
The comparative statics of the market equilibrium are very intuitive. The equilibrium level
of entrepreneurial activity n∗E is increasing in the probability of success ρ, the payoff y, the
number of angels n˜, and their levels of wealth w˜; it is decreasing in the required amount of
16Note that the total capital demand, E(α) ≡ γ2ρ(1 − α)yφ, is decreasing in α, while the total capital supply
from investors, I(α) ≡
[
αρyφ − 1
]
n˜w˜, is increasing in α. Moreover, note that E
(
φ
ρy
)
> I
(
φ
ρy
)
= 0, and
I(1) > E(1) = 0. This implies that the market equilibrium is unique.
17We can also interpret Figure 1 using the concept of valuation. The so-called post-money valuation of a venture
investment is defined as φ/α, so that a higher α corresponds to a lower valuation. Entrepreneurs prefer higher
valuations, investors prefer lower valuations. As α increases, entrepreneurs’ utilities decrease and the demand
slopes downwards, but investor’s utilities increase and the supply slopes upwards.
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capital φ. The investor’s ownership stake α∗ is increasing in φ and γ, and it is decreasing in n˜,
w˜, ρ, and y.
To examine whether the market equilibrium is efficient, we compare it with the first best
equilibrium that maximizes the sum of all utilities (i.e., the total expected utility of all en-
trepreneurs and investors).
Proposition 1 Without intergenerational dynamics, the competitive equilibrium is socially effi-
cient.
The equilibrium in the benchmark model is efficient, because it is a standard competitive
Walrasian model with no externalities. Even though there is no rationale for government in-
tervention, it is still instructive to look at the effects of two alternative types of government
subsidies (we discuss the interpretation of theses subsidies in Section 3). The first subsidy tar-
gets the demand side by subsidizing founding, the second subsidy targets the supply side by
subsidizing funding. We take the total available government budget as given, and ask which
policy is more effective in fostering entrepreneurship.
We define a founding subsidy as an in-kind support to potential entrepreneurs that want to
start a venture. The subsidy specifically reduces the non-monetary cost of entry by SE , which
implies that entry is now optimal as long as UE ≥ l − SE .18 The entry subsidy SE affects the
entry and market clearing conditions as follows:
nE = γρ(1− α)y + SE (3)
γ [γρ(1− α)y + SE]φ =
[
α
ρy
φ
− 1
]
n˜w˜. (4)
We see from the entry condition (3) that founding subsidies have a direct and positive effect on
entry. This in turn increases the demand for capital, as can be seen from the market clearing
condition (4). This affects α, the equilibrium equity stake for investors.
Next, we define a funding subsidy as a financial support to potential investors that want to
invest in new ventures with good projects. For now we consider a simple tax-credit of sI for
every unit of investment. This means that when investing k, an angel receives a total tax credit
of ksI .19 Section 2.6 also looks at alternative funding policies.
18We assume that the government cannot discriminate among entrepreneurs with different values of l, so that
all entrepreneurs that want to enter can take advantage of the subsidy. Moreover, in the case of l < SE we simply
assume that the entrants’ cost of entry remains zero, but that the government still pays the full cost.
19Again we assume that the government cannot discriminate among investors with different values of θ, so that
all investors receive the same subsidy.
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Unlike a founding subsidy SE that is given to all projects, a funding subsidy only applies
to good projects, i.e., to those that pass the investor screen. For our policy comparison it is
useful to define SI ≡ γφsI as the expected funding subsidy per firm. This ensures that the
government’s overall payouts under the two policies are the same whenever SE = SI .20
With a funding subsidy SI the market equilibrium is characterized by the following entry
and market clearing conditions:
nE = γρ(1− α)y (5)
γ2ρ (1− α) yφ =
[
α
ρy
φ
− 1 + 1
φ
1
γ
SI
]
n˜w˜. (6)
A funding subsidy increases the supply of angel capital, thereby directly affecting the equi-
librium investor stake α∗. Through α∗, it indirectly affects the equilibrium number of en-
trepreneurs (n∗E), as can be seen from the entry condition (5).
Providing a subsidy naturally has a cost in the ecosystem, which we can think of as the cost
of raising distortionary taxes. To keep our analysis focused on the relative merits of founding
versus funding subsidies, we refrain from modeling the government’s overall maximization
problem of what level of subsidies to provide. Instead we consider a small fixed government
budget, and ask how it can be applied to either a founding subsidy SE or a funding subsidy SI .
We begin by stating a useful benchmark results concerning the effects of demand-side versus
supply-side polices.
Proposition 2 Consider the benchmark model without intergenerational dynamics.
(ii) The effect of a demand-side founding subsidy (SE) is to increase the equilibrium number
of entrepreneurs (n∗E), and to increase the investor’s ownership stake (α
∗).
(iii) The effect of a supply-side funding subsidy (SI) is to increase the equilibrium number of
entrepreneurs (n∗E), and to decrease the investor’s ownership stake (α
∗).
(iv) Equivalent levels of founding and funding subsidies (SE = SI) result in equivalent equi-
librium numbers of entrepreneurs (n∗E(SE) = n
∗
E (SI)), but with different ownership
stakes (α∗(SE) > α∗ (SI)).
20For example, suppose there are 1, 000 new ventures, of which 800 have good projects (γ = 0.8). If the
government’s budget is $1M , then the (expected) founding subsidy is simply SE = $1, 000. This is received by
all 1, 000 firms, thus costing the government $1M . The combined funding subsidy given to all angels investing in
a single firm with a good project, is φsI = $1, 250. Overall there are 800 good firms, so that the total cost for the
government is again $1M . The expected funding subsidy for all firms (with good and bad projects) is given by
SI = γφsI = 0.8 ∗ 1, 250 = $1000.
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Figure 2: Benchmark Model – Effect of Subsidies
Figure 2 accompanies Proposition 2, showing in Panel A the effect of a founding policies
(SE), and in Panel B the effect of funding policy (SI). We can see that both policies are effective
in raising the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity: founding subsidies by shifting the
demand curve, and funding subsidies by shifting the supply curve.
An important finding is that the two policies create different equilibrium investment terms.
Founding policies create relatively more favorable terms for investors, as they lead to relatively
higher ownership stakes α∗ (i.e., lower valuations). At first glance one might have expected that
funding policies would be more favorable for investors, because investors receive a subsidy.
However, our equilibrium analysis suggests an interesting countervailing mechanism. With
a founding subsidy, more entrepreneurs enter the market and seek funding. This creates a
competitive dynamic where entrepreneurs bid up the stakes they are willing to give to investors
in exchange for funding. Hence the benefit of the subsidy is partly offset by lower valuations,
i.e., higher equity stakes for investors.
The last part of Proposition 2 states that comparable subsidy levels (SE = SI) generate
identical levels of entrepreneurial activity (n∗E(SE) = n
∗
E (SI)). However, the mechanisms
behind founding and funding subsidies are fundamentally different, as the former affect the
non-monetary cost of entering the market for entrepreneurs, whereas the latter affect the in-
vestment terms obtained after entering the market. In fact, in the Online Appendix we show
that in equilibrium angels have the same expected wealth at the end of the period, irrespective
of whether they receive the monetary funding subsidy or not. However, entrepreneurs end up
with a higher expected wealth under the (monetary) funding subsidy than the (non-monetary)
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founding subsidy. Most important, we will now see that this ‘equivalence result’ only applies to
the benchmark model, but will not be true in our main model with intergenerational dynamics.
2.3 Model With Intergenerational Dynamics
In this section we add intergenerational dynamics by introducing entrepreneurial angels. Specif-
ically, we allow successful entrepreneurs to invest their wealth into the next generation of en-
trepreneurs.
An important change in the model with entrepreneurial angels concerns the expected utility
of becoming an entrepreneur, which now includes not only the returns from the entrepreneurial
activity itself, but also the returns from future angel investing. Specifically, a successful en-
trepreneur will bring (1− αt) y of wealth into the next period. She can then invest her wealth
either in new ventures or in the safe asset. As long as her individual investment cost θ in the
next period (t+ 1) is sufficiently low (θ ≤ θ̂t+1), it is optimal for the entrepreneur to invest the
entire wealth (1− αt) y in new ventures. The discounted net return from the angel investments
is given by
(
αt+1
ρy
φ
− θ
)
(1− αt) y. Otherwise, if her investment cost is too high (θ > θ̂t+1),
she invests her entire wealth in the safe asset, which yields the net return (1− αt) y. At time t,
the realization of θ is still unknown, so the expected utility of an entrepreneur at time t is
UE,t = γρ
[∫ θ̂t+1
0
(
αt+1
ρy
φ
− θ
)
(1− αt) ydθ +
∫ 1
θ̂t+1
(1− αt) ydθ
]
,
where θ̂t+1 = αt+1 ρyφ − 1.
The entry condition for entrepreneurs is then given by
nE,t = UE,t. (7)
An important element of the intergenerational model is that the number of angels depends
on the number of successful entrepreneurs from the previous period (γρnE,t−1). Formally, the
number of entrepreneurial angels actually investing in new ventures in period t is given by
θ̂tγρnE,t−1. Each of these angels invests the amount (1−αt−1)y. The market clearing condition
is thus given by
γnE,tφ =
[
αt
ρy
φ
− 1
]
γρnE,t−1(1− αt−1)y. (8)
In each period, the intergenerational model has a unique equilibrium that is defined by the
entry condition (7) and the market clearing condition (8). We can see from (7) in conjunction
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Figure 3: Dynamic Model – Equilibria
with (8) that entrepreneurial entry in the previous period (nE,t−1) affects the present equilibrium
equity stake for investors (αt), and therefore the present entry of entrepreneurs (nE,t).
Even though each period has a unique equilibrium, there may be multiple steady state equi-
libria to which the period equilibrium converges to. We show this formally in the Online Ap-
pendix. For the main text we refer to Figure 3, which illustrates the dynamic evolution of the
key state variable n∗E,t from one period to the next. Specifically, the S-shaped curve in Figure
3 shows how n∗E,t depends on n
∗
E,t−1. It starts at the origin, and has a strictly positive slope.
Intuitively, more entrepreneurial activity in the previous period creates a larger pool of potential
angels, which results in a higher level of entrepreneurial activity in the current period. However,
the slope of the curve varies and may be less than 1, suggesting that a unit increase in the past
activity may result in less than a unit increase in the current period.
In a steady state we have n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1; this is where the S-curve intersects the 45 degree
line, as shown in Figure 3. Clearly, this always happens at the origin where n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 = 0.
The question is whether there are further intersections so that n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 > 0. This happens
in Panel B of Figure 3, but not in Panel A. In the Online Appendix we formally show that there
exists a critical investment level φ̂ ∈ (0, ρy) such that for φ > φ̂ only the low steady state
equilibrium n∗E,t = n
∗
E,t−1 = 0 exists (as shown in Panel A), but for φ < φ̂ three steady state
equilibria exist (as shown in Panel B). Moreover, standard dynamic analysis reveals that the
lowest and the highest equilibria are stable, while the middle one is unstable. We can therefore
focus on the low and high equilibrium.21
21For φ = φ̂ two equilibria exist, the low one is stable, the high one unstable. In the Online Appendix we further
show that given uniform distributions for l and θ, the maximum number of equilibria is three.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Model – Capital Supply and Demand
To better understand the structure of these equilibria, consider Figure 4 which illustrates
steady state demand and supply functions. Even though the entrepreneur’s utility function UE,t
is now more complicated, as it includes the returns to angel investing, we show in the Online
Appendix that the demand function continues to be downward sloping. The supply function (I),
however, becomes non-monotonic. Initially it is upward sloping for the same reason that it is
upward sloping in Figure 1, namely that higher returns induce angels to invest more. However,
there is an important countervailing effect that becomes dominant for larger values of α. Giving
investors a higher equity share also means leaving entrepreneurs with a lower share. This has
no effect on the total wealth available for investments in a model without intergenerational
linkages. With such linkages, however, it means that entrepreneurial angels have less wealth to
invest. That is, a higher share for investors means better returns to current angel investors, but
also less wealth for future angel investors. The second effect can dominate, thus causing the
supply curve to bend backwards. Indeed, as α approaches 1, the supply curve falls back to zero.
This is for the simple reason that at α = 1, even successful entrepreneurs have no wealth, and
therefore have nothing to invest.
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the case of φ > φ̂, and Panel B the case of φ < φ̂. The
difference between Panel A and Panel B is that in Panel A the supply curve begins to slope
backwards relatively early, before ever intersecting with the demand curve. In this case the only
equilibrium is the low equilibrium, as depicted in Panel A of Figure 3. In Panel B the supply
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curve intersects the demand curve before sloping down again. This is what creates the three
equilibria depicted in Panel B of Figure 3.22
2.4 The Effect of Government Subsidies
Before looking at the effects of founding and funding subsidies in the model with intergen-
erational dynamics, we ask whether there is indeed a role for the government to intervene in
the market. For this we compare the high steady state equilibrium (denoted by {n∗E;α∗}) with
the first best equilibrium (denoted by {nfbE ;αfb}) that maximizes the steady state sum of all
expected utilities (i.e., total welfare).
Proposition 3 The high steady state equilibrium does not maximize welfare, because it has too
few entrepreneurial ventures (i.e., n∗E < n
fb
E ), and investors get too much equity (i.e., α
∗ > αfb).
Proposition 3 shows that the competitive equilibrium is not first best. The underlying rea-
son is that there is an intergenerational externality. Entrepreneurs and angel investor take into
account their contemporaneous utilities, and entrepreneurs take into account the future utility
of potentially becoming an angel investor, but no one takes into account the utility of future
entrepreneurs. Future entrepreneurs need experienced angel investors, and therefore rely on the
wealth creation of past generations of entrepreneurs. We find that relative to the first best level,
there is insufficient entrepreneurial wealth creation. Investors get too much equity, and success-
ful entrepreneurs have too little wealth for reinvesting in the next generation of entrepreneurs.
This result provides a rationale for government action (provided the cost of any intervention is
not too high).
Consider first the effects of a founding subsidy SE . We treat this as a non-monetary subsidy
that makes it easier for entrepreneurs to start a new venture. The effect of the subsidy is to
reduce the costs of entry, i.e., the effective cost of entry becomes l − SE . For now we focus on
22The intuition for why the existence of a high equilibrium requires lower capital needs φ can be obtained
from Figure 3. For a given number of old entrepreneurs (nE,t−1), lower values of φ permit a greater number of
new entrepreneurs (nE,t) to be funded. This means that in Figure 3 lower values of φ lift the S-curve up. In
Figure 4, this gets translated into a leftward shift of the supply curve, again representing a greater number of new
entrepreneurs (nE,t). It follows that multiple equilibria can only exist for sufficiently low values of φ, as shown in
Panel B of Figures 3 and 4.
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the high steady state equilibrium (where nE,t = nE,t−1 and αt = αt−1), which is defined by the
following conditions:
nE = UE + SE (9)
φ =
(
α
ρy
φ
− 1
)
ρ (1− α) y, (10)
where
UE = γρ
[∫ θ̂t+1
0
(
αt+1
ρy
φ
− θ
)
(1− α) ydθ +
∫ 1
θ̂t+1
(1− α) ydθ
]
.
The level of entrepreneurial activity, n∗E , is defined by the entry condition (9). The equilibrium
equity stake for investors, α∗, is characterized by the market clearing condition (10).
Proposition 4 The effect of a founding subsidy SE in the high steady state equilibrium is to
increase the level of entrepreneurial activity (i.e., dn∗E(SE)/dSE > 0). However, there is no
effect on the equilibrium ownership stake (i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE = 0).
The first part of Proposition 4 is intuitive: founding subsidies lower barriers to entry and
therefore encourage more entrepreneurs to start new ventures, as can be seen from the entry
condition (9). This corresponds to an upward shift of the demand curve. In the model with
intergenerational linkages, more entry also increases the number of successful entrepreneurs
that become angel investors. This causes the supply curve to shift upwards, which further
increases the equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity. In equilibrium the demand and supply
effect reinforce each other and create a robust positive effect on the level of entrepreneurial
activity.
The second part of Proposition 4 about constant ownership stakes contrasts with the findings
from the model without intergenerational linkages, where founding subsidies were associated
with higher ownership stakes (i.e., lower valuations). To make sense of this we note that the
equilibrium ownership stake for investors, α∗, is determined by the ratio of entrepreneurs to
angels in the market. The equilibrium ownership stake can only change if this ratio changes. We
know from Proposition 4 that a founding subsidy SE encourages more entrepreneurs to enter,
and this leads to more angel investors in the next period. In the high steady state equilibrium it
turns out that the increase in the number of entrepreneurs is followed by a proportional increase
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in the number of angel investors. This leaves the equilibrium ratio of entrepreneurs to investors
unaffected, and thus the ownership stake α∗ does not change.23
Next we consider the effects of a funding subsidy SI on the high steady state equilibrium,
which is defined by the following entry and market clearing conditions:
nE = UE(SI) (11)
φ =
(
α
ρy
φ
− 1 + 1
φ
1
γ
SI
)
ρ (1− α) y, (12)
where
UE(SI) = γρ
[∫ θ̂t+1+ 1φ 1γ SI
0
(
αt+1
ρy
φ
+
1
φ
1
γ
SI − θ
)
(1− α) ydθ +
∫ 1
θ̂t+1+
1
φ
1
γ
SI
(1− α) ydθ
]
.
In the model with intergenerational dynamics, a funding subsidy SI does not only affect the
capital supply (as in our benchmark model), but also the expected utility of an entrepreneur,
UE(SI), and therefore the overall level of entrepreneurial activity, n∗E . Specifically, we can see
from the entry condition (11) that a funding subsidy increases the expected returns from angel
investment. This increases the threshold cost θ̂t+1 + 1φ
1
γ
SI , and thus increases the marginal
incentive to invest in new ventures as opposed to the safe asset.
Proposition 5 The effect of a funding subsidy SI in the high steady state equilibrium is to
increase the level of entrepreneurial activity (i.e., dn∗E (SI) /dSI > 0). In addition, it decreases
the equilibrium ownership stake (i.e., dα∗ (SI) /dSI < 0).
Proposition 5 shows that funding policies again increase the level of entrepreneurial activity.
They clearly shift the supply curve upwards as the subsidy increases the net return to angel
investing. They also shift the demand curve. Entry becomes more attractive not only because of
a lower α (which represents a movement along the demand curve), but also because the subsidy
increases the rewards to being a successful entrepreneur, who use the subsidies once becoming
an angel investor. Again the demand and supply effect reinforce each other to increase the
equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity.
Unlike in Proposition 4, however, there is an effect on equilibrium ownership stakes, which
is reduced by higher subsidies. This is in line with the findings from Proposition 2. Specifically,
23This particular result depends on the assumption of no external angels. Once we allow for some external
angels (see Section 2.5), the ratio of entrepreneurs to angels changes with SE , and we find again that ownership
shares for investors increase with founding subsidies, i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE > 0.
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funding subsidies encourage more potential angel investors to actually invest in new ventures,
as reflected by the threshold value θ̂+ 1
φ
1
γ
SI . This increases the number of active angels relative
to the number of entrepreneurs, and therefore results in lower equilibrium ownership stakes for
angel investors.
We are finally in a position to address the key question of how the two policies compare.
Proposition 6 Consider a founding and a funding subsidy at equivalent levels of subsidization,
so that SE = SI > 0. In the high steady state the funding subsidy generates a higher level of
entrepreneurial activity than the founding subsidy, i.e., n∗E (SI) > n
∗
E(SE). It also generates a
lower level of investor ownership, i.e., α∗ (SI) < α∗(SE).
Proposition 6 stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 2 where we found that the two policies
did not generate different levels of entrepreneurial activities. This is no longer true in the pres-
ence of intergenerational linkages. Funding subsidies generate a higher level of entrepreneurial
activity than founding subsidies, precisely because of their long-term intergenerational impact.
Funding policies ultimately benefit entrepreneurs by increasing valuations (i.e., lowering α).
Having entrepreneurs retaining larger ownership stakes increases the amount of wealth that
they can invest in the next generation of entrepreneurs. Moreover, a funding subsidy encourages
more successful entrepreneurs to invest their wealth into entrepreneurial ventures, as opposed to
the safe asset. This creates a virtuous cycle that permanently increases entrepreneurial activity.
2.5 Catalyst Government Policies
So far we examined how permanent government policies affect entrepreneurship in the high
steady state equilibrium. However, an ecosystem may not necessarily be in the high equilibrium.
In this section we briefly show how temporary subsidies can be used to help an ecosystem to
move towards the high steady state equilibrium.
Let us consider an ecosystem that has some level of entrepreneurship, but it is below the
unstable middle equilibrium nME , as shown in Panel B of Figure 3. Standard dynamic analysis
reveals that, in the absence of any government policies, an ecosystem converges to the high
(low) equilibrium whenever the current level of activity nE,t lies above (below) the critical
threshold nME . Now suppose the government is looking for a temporary subsidy to push the
ecosystem above the critical level nME , in order to set it onto a path towards the high equilibrium
(nHE ).
24 Specifically, suppose the government offers a one-time subsidy SE,t (founding subsidy)
24Strictly speaking, the economy can be below nME , but it needs to be above the zero equilibrium. This is for the
simple reason that in the zero equilibrium there are no entrepreneurs that can be subsidized. Once we introduce
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or SI,t (funding subsidy) in period t. For parsimony we derive the new equilibrium conditions
in the Online Appendix; here we simply state our main finding:
Proposition 7 Compared to a temporary founding subsidy (SE,t), an equivalent temporary
funding subsidy (SI,t) leads to more entrepreneurship in period t as well as in all subsequent pe-
riods. Formally, for SI,t = SE,t, we find that n∗E,t+i(SI,t) > n
∗
E,t+i(SE,t) for all i = 0, 1, ...,∞.
The key difference between a temporary founding or funding subsidy is their dynamic effect
on future market outcomes. Proposition 2 implies that a funding subsidy creates wealthier
entrepreneurs that have more to invest in the next generation of entrepreneurs.25 It is therefore
easy to see that a temporary funding policy advances the ecosystem further towards the high
steady state equilibrium than a founding policy. The key insight is that what matters is not
only increasing the current level of entrepreneurial activity, but also increasing the amount of
wealth available to future entrepreneurial angels. Consequently we find that the same logic that
made funding subsidies powerful in the high steady state equilibrium, also applies to catalyst
policies for pushing the ecosystem towards the high equilibrium. Note, however, that the high
steady state equilibrium itself is not affected by a temporary subsidy, as the eventual point of
convergence remains the same for both types of subsidy.
2.6 On the Optimality of Funding Subsidies
Our main model focuses on two prominent classes of entrepreneurship policies: those targeted
at encouraging entrepreneurial entry, and those targeted at facilitating the financing of en-
trepreneurial ventures. This allows us to identify the key economic properties of demand-based
versus supply-based policy approaches within a dynamic entrepreneurial ecosystem. Empiri-
cally, there are many different types of entrepreneurship policies used by governments around
the globe; we discuss this further in Section 3. From a theory perspective, the question is
whether funding policies are always optimal within the current model.
We assume that the government can only offer non-discriminatory policies, i.e., it cannot
offer differential subsidies to different entrepreneurs or angel investors. In the Online Appendix
we formally show that in our model a funding subsidy is an optimal subsidy. We first show that
relative to a founding subsidy, a funding subsidy achieves not only higher activity levels, but
also higher levels of social welfare (as measured by the sum of all utilities). We then show that
external angels, there are always some entrepreneurs (see Section 3.3), and this technical requirement becomes
irrelevant.
25In the Online Appendix we formally show that this effect on the expected wealth of entrepreneur, remains true
in the model with catalyst policies; see Proof of Proposition 7.
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within the constraints of our model, there are no other subsidies that can achieve higher social
welfare levels for a given government budget.26
There is one interesting twist to this argument. So far we have expressed funding subsidies
in terms of investment subsidies. We now go one step further and show that we could also think
of funding policies as return subsidies. That is, in our model funding subsidies are optimal, but
they can be implemented either as investment subsidies, or as return subsidies. Let us explain.
Return subsidies affect the payoff (y) from a venture in case of success. Capital gains reliefs
are a prominent example for this class of subsidies: Many governments offer some kind of
preferential treatment for capital gains from entrepreneurial ventures; the US Small Business
Jobs Act of 2010 is a recent example. Similarly, corporate tax rates and other business taxes
can also affect the returns to entrepreneurial ventures.
To model the effect of return subsidies, suppose the government can provide direct or indi-
rect support that increases the returns of a venture from y to y + τ . We note that entrepreneurs
and investors only benefit from this subsidy when their ventures succeed. From an ex-ante per-
spective, the discounted expected value from the return subsidy is given by SR = γρτ , so that
each new venture with a good project generates the expected payoff y + SR
γρ
.
In the Online Appendix we derive the new equilibrium conditions, and obtain the following
three main results about the properties of return subsidies. First, for the benchmark model with-
out dynamic linkages, we find that larger return subsidies lead to more entry (dn∗E(SR)/dSR >
0) and lower ownership stakes for investors (dα∗(SR)/dSR < 0). Moreover, we extend the
equivalence result from Proposition 2 by showing that return subsidies achieve the same level of
entrepreneurial activity as comparable founding or funding subsidies (i.e., n∗E(SR) = n
∗
E(SE) =
n∗E (SI) for all SR = SE = SI). Second, we show that larger return subsidies also increase entry
and decrease ownership stakes in the dynamic model with intergenerational linkages. Finally we
show that return and funding subsidies have in fact identical properties, in the sense that equiv-
alent subsidy levels (SR = SI) generate the same equilibrium level of entrepreneurial activity
(n∗E(SR) = n
∗
E (SI)), and even the same expected level of entrepreneurial wealth. The reason
for this last result is that both policies create the same expected net value for an entrepreneurial
venture with a good project, as given by ρy−φ+SR+SI . The equilibrium allocation of this net
value between the entrepreneur and investor is then determined by the same underlying market
forces, irrespective of whether funding or return subsidies are used.27
26Our sparse model set-up naturally limits the set of potential government policies; in reality governments can
call upon a much richer set of policies. We discuss this further in Section 3.
27Finally we briefly note that the equivalence of funding subsidies (SI ) and return subsidies (SR) can be further
expanded using the well-established ‘tax incidence equivalence’ (TIE) result. This says that the burden of a tax
(or subsidy) on buyers and sellers is independent of who nominally pays the tax (or receives the subsidy). In the
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3 Model Extensions
3.1 Experience and Capital
For our base specification we used the simplest possible investor model, where the only smart
investors are formerly successful entrepreneurs. Only they can observe whether the project is
good or bad. Other ‘not so smart’ investors can’t, and therefore never invest. Clearly this model
is highly stylized, so it might be useful to briefly reiterate its purpose. Our core argument is
that financing entrepreneurs requires ‘experienced capital’. A prior literature (see Da Rin et
al. (2013)) richly documents the notion that investing in start-ups requires an active investment
style by capable investors. The novel part of our argument is that this capability derives from a
prior experience of being a successful entrepreneur. This is what gives rise to the intergenera-
tional dynamics that drive our new results.
Given the centrality of investor experience in our model, let us provide some preliminary
empirical evidence about the experience of angel investors. We gathered data from AngelList,
the leading US angel investment online platform. Among other things it allows investors to
post their profile.28 In July 2017 we downloaded the profiles of angel investors who declared an
interest to invest in three parts of the US: (i) Silicon Valley, the most important entrepreneurial
ecosystem in the world, (ii) Florida, a state with a large number of wealthy individuals, and
(iii) North Carolina, which contains the research triangle, an important technology cluster.29
We then identify whether these angels had previously founded any companies. Based on this
we classified angels into two categories, those with and those without prior entrepreneurial
experience. Using additional web searches we also verified that their prior companies can be
legitimately considered start-ups, and not investment vehicles or charitable organizations. Table
1 shows our main findings.
For Silicon Valley we find that 71.9% of all angels are angels with prior entrepreneurial
experience. In Florida it is 46.8%, and for North Carolina it is 36.4%. Interestingly, angels
with prior entrepreneurial experience make on average more investments in startup companies:
74.1% of all investments in Silicon Valley are made by entrepreneurial angels, 68.3% in Florida,
and 68.2% in North Carolina. Moreover, in Silicon Valley the average number of start-ups that
Online Appendix we show how the usual TIE result applies in our context. In particular, it does not matter whether
the funding subsidy SI is given to the investor or the entrepreneur. This is because the nominal ’price’ α readjusts
to generate the same real price, irrespective of who nominally receives the subsidy.
28See URL: https://angel.co/people/all
29On AngelList there were in total 2,690 profiles of angels interested to invest in Silicon Valley, 370 in Florida,
and 151 in North Carolina. However, for Silicon Valley, AngelList only allowed to access the profiles of 587 angels
(likely due to some download restrictions).
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SILICON VALLEY 
 
FLORIDA 
 
NORTH CAROLINA 
 Entrepreneurial angels 
Non-entrepreneurial 
angels 
Entrepreneurial 
angels 
Non-entrepreneurial 
angels 
Entrepreneurial 
angels 
Non-entrepreneurial 
angels 
 
Percentage of angels 
 
71.9% 28.1% 46.8% 53.2% 36.4% 63.6% 
 
Percentage of start-up 
investments 
 
74.1% 25.9% 68.3% 31.7% 68.2% 31.8% 
 
Average (median) number  
of start-up investments made 
 
34.6 (25) 30.9 (24) 6.3 (2) 1.3 (0) 9.1 (3) 2.4 (1) 
 
Average (median) number  
of start-ups founded 
 
2.2 (2) 0 (0) 2.2 (2) 0 (0) 1.9 (2) 0 (0) 
 
Table 1: Prior Entrepreneurial Experience (AngelList)
entrepreneurial angels have founded, is 2.2 (median of 2), suggesting that many angels have
substantial entrepreneurial experience. The averages for Florida and North Carolina are close
by, at 2.2 and 1.9 (both with median of 2).30
Overall this preliminary data supports our core assumption that experienced entrepreneurs
play a central role in angel markets. At the same time it also raises some additional challenges
for the theory. Many but not all angel investors are experienced entrepreneurs. This would
suggest that our model ought to be robust to adding some smart investors that are not formerly
successful entrepreneurs. From a theory perspective, this means that in addition to the endoge-
nously determined entrepreneurial angels, there can also be exogenous angels active in the mar-
ket. In the Online Appendix we derive such a model extensions. The main notable difference is
that the low equilibrium now has a positive level of investments and entrepreneurs.31
A second challenge for the theory is that other ‘not so smart’ investors are not necessar-
ily excluded from the angel market. Let us motivate this point with another observation from
AngelList. In addition to allowing companies and investors to list their information on the web-
site, AngelList also has a ’Syndicates’ function that enables crowdfunding through its platform.
Syndicates are structured around a lead investor who commits to providing a certain amount of
core funding. Other investors can then join the syndicate through a simple online investment
process. Agrawal et al. (2016) empirically investigate these syndicates and show how they
30Another interesting piece of evidence comes from a survey of European entrepreneurs, which finds that 44%
of experienced repeat entrepreneurs make angel investments (Atomico, 2016, p. 59). This report also notes the rise
of founder-led funds, quoting Philipp Magin, founder of Quandoo and cofounder of CityDeal/Group: “Yes, there
is an emergence of founder-led funds. The reason for this seems to be pretty clear - founders aim to invest proceeds
from previous successful entrepreneurial activities in the area where they have high expertise, and institutional as
well as private or corporate investors trust their experience-based assessment and join as LPs.” (Atomico, 2016, p.
60).
31The model with some exogenous angels is technically the same as the small open ecosystems model discussed
in Section 3.3.
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allow reputable angel investors to leverage their investments with funding from a crowd of less
experienced investors. Other equity crowdfunding websites, such as SyndicateRoom in the UK,
also offer similar investment structures for crowd investors.
All this suggests that general investors might be able to ride on the coattails of smart in-
vestors. Modeling the micro-foundations of how smart and other investors interact is beyond
the scope of this paper (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994, Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007,
Kremer, 1998). We use a simple ‘reduced form’ approach to model how ‘not so smart’ investors
can join the investments of smart investors. Suppose again that only smart investors can identify
companies with good projects, but suppose now that they can leverage their investments with
capital from other investors. For simplicity we assume that smart investors need to provide a
minimum amount of capital ωφ (where ω ∈ (0, 1)). This can now be topped up with (1 − ω)φ
of ‘not so smart’ capital, which we assume can be supplied at will. We maintain the assumption
that ω > 0, because smart investors need to have some incentives to properly identify good com-
panies, and to provide some value-adding support (Da Rin et al., 2013). In the Online Appendix
we rederive the market equilibrium and establish the following two main insights.
First, the smaller ω, the larger the total angel market. This is simply because a smaller ω
allows for a bigger leverage of other capital. This suggests that leveraging other investors has a
positive effect on the level of entrepreneurship. The crowdfunding syndicate structure analyzed
by Agrawal et al. (2016), for example, should therefore help to increase the size of the angel
market. Second, the main results from Propositions 1-6 continue to hold for all values of ω.
While ‘not so smart’ capital increases the size of the market, the comparative statics of the
model, including all the policy results, depend on the intergenerational linkages, and are not
affected by ω.
3.2 Serial Investors and Entrepreneurs
In this section we examine the implications of angels being able to invest over multiple peri-
ods, what we call serial angel investing. Part of our motivation here is to look for boundary
conditions of our main policy result. One conjecture is that serial angel investments can reverse
our main result that funding policies foster more entrepreneurship than founding policies in the
long-term. The intuition is that if angels invest over longer periods, then there might be a ben-
efit to having wealthy angels rather than wealthy entrepreneurs. However, it turns out that this
intuition is incorrect.
In the Online Appendix we provide a model extension where at the end of each period in-
vestors continue for another period with some probability σI , and retire with probability (1−σI).
24
This implies a Markov process where investors invest on average for 1/σI periods.32 Again we
first consider a benchmark model without intergenerational transitions. Serial angels increase
the overall level of entrepreneurship by increasing the supply of capital. However, even with
serial angels, the equivalence result of Proposition 2 continues to hold. This is because a found-
ing subsidy generates a higher investor stake α, but a funding subsidy directly increases investor
returns at a given α. In the model with intergenerational linkages and serial investors we also
find that our main results continue to hold. Overall we note that adding serial investors does not
change our core results.
The model extension in the Online Appendix also allows for serial entrepreneurs. Again
we use a Markov model where after each period entrepreneurs can start another company with
some probability σE , and otherwise transition to the angel stage. Serial entrepreneurs do not
need to re-incur the fixed costs. The Online Appendix shows that all of our main results about
the effects of subsidies remain intact. Yet another model variation looks at the possibility that
some entrepreneurs grow their companies, instead of exiting at the end of the first period. This is
sometimes called the scale-up stage, i.e., the growth stage that comes after the start-up stage.33
Formally, with probability ξ a successful entrepreneur has a growth option to increase the value
of the company. We show that having more entrepreneurs with the option to grow their com-
panies, leads more entrepreneurs and angels in the steady state equilibrium, as well as lower
equity shares for investors.
3.3 Open Ecosystems
Our main model considers a single ecosystem in isolation; we now examine how capital may
flow from one ecosystem to another.34 While a complete formal derivation of all the properties
of the dynamic equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper, we briefly discuss how the model
can be extended to allow for capital flows across ecosystems. For this we focus at a model
where capital moves from a large to a small ecosystem.35 Similar to a ‘small open economy’
32One technical detail worth mentioning is that in order to solve the Markov model with serial angel investing we
need stationarity. While we noted that the base model can be solved either with proportional or fixed investors costs,
this particular model extension can only be solved with proportional costs, as this is the only way of generating a
stationary Markov process.
33See Duruflé et al (2018).
34Relatively little is known about cross-border angel investing, but the empirical evidence on venture capital
suggests that foreign investors play a considerable role in many less developed markets (see Aizenman and Kendall
(2012)). An interesting case study is Israel (Avnimelech et al. (2005), Senor and Singer (2009)) which explicitly
attracted foreign investors, mostly from the US, to jump-start its entrepreneurial ecosystem.
35Our analysis here focuses on capital flows between ecosystems. A related issue is labor mobility of en-
trepreneurs, often referred to as brain drain. This is clearly a complex phenomenon, and its analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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Figure 5: Equilibria with Foreign Angels
in the international trade literature, we look at the effect of a large system on a small system,
without worrying about any reverse effects. Such a model captures the situation of many regions
with smaller ecosystems that want to tap into Silicon Valley, as mentioned in the Introduction.
Consider two countries, called A and B. Suppose that the entrepreneurial ecosystem in A
is relatively small compared to B’s, and assume that A (B) is in a low (high) equilibrium.
We know from Section 2.3 that investors get a relatively higher ownership stake α in the low
equilibrium. This encourages foreign investors from country B to invest in A. Thus, capital
always flows from B to A. Suppose there are n˜ investors in B, each with wealth w˜, who
consider to invest in A. They face a distance cost λ > 0 for every unit of capital invested
abroad. The total flow of capital from B to A is given by KB =
(
θ̂ − λ
)
n˜w˜. Adding this to
the usual domestic supply of capital, we rederive the equilibrium in the Online Appendix. In
the main text we use a graphical approach.
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Figure 5 illustrates the effects of foreign angel capital KB flowing into country A. This
shifts up the supply curve but does not affect demand. Panel A shows a small infusion of
foreign capital. In the steady state equilibrium we find that this leads to higher entry levels (n∗E)
and lower ownership stakes (α∗). The low equilibrium continues to exist, but is no longer fixed
at the origin (i.e., n∗E > 0). In equilibrium some investors are foreign, others are domestic.
The latter are successful domestic entrepreneurs from the prior generation, many of whom were
themselves funded by foreign investors.
Panel B of Figure 5 shows the effect of a larger infusion of foreign capitalKB. Once the sup-
ply curve shifts sufficiently, the low steady state equilibrium disappears. This generates some
interesting dynamics. Initially the majority of deals is funded by foreign investors. They create
some successful domestic entrepreneurs who invest into the next generation of entrepreneurs.
Over time the foreign investors are increasingly joined by domestic entrepreneurial angels. As
the ecosystem moves towards the high equilibrium, the fraction of ventures funded by foreign
angels decreases. This is because there are more domestic entrepreneurial angels, and because
over time valuations in A increase, making country A less attractive to foreign investors. As A
approaches the high equilibrium, foreign investors no longer play a role, since all entrepreneurs
in A are funded by home-grown entrepreneurial angels.
How do founding and funding policies interact with foreign capital? The Online Appendix
shows that all the results from the base model continue to apply.36 An interesting question is
whether the funding subsidy should be given only to domestic investors or also to foreign in-
vestors. Our model suggests that it should be given to both, for the simple reason that not giving
it to foreign investors would limit the supply of the much needed capital. This is particularly
true near the low steady state equilibrium, where the majority of funding comes from foreign
investors. In practice governments may be reluctant to hand out subsidies to foreigners. The key
insight from this model is that ‘experienced’ foreign money helps to build domestic experience,
and therefore has a positive externality on the domestic ecosystem.
So far our analysis assumes that the quality of ventures is the same in the two ecosystems.
A prior literature on entrepreneurial ecosystems (see Kenney (2000) and Lee et al. (2000)) sug-
gests that ecosystems have multiple feedback loops that help to improve the quality of ventures.
While our model emphasizes dynamic externalities, this literature emphasizes ‘cross-sectional’
externalities, i.e., externalities across firms, as well as between firms, investors, and other ser-
vice providers. Formally modelling this is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to
36One noteworthy difference is that the slight counter-intuitive finding in Proposition 4 that dα∗(SE)/dSE = 0
no longer applies. Once we allow for some foreign angels we find again that ownership increases with founding
subsidies, i.e., dα∗(SE)/dSE > 0.
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briefly consider a simple ‘reduced form’ version where project quality is increasing in the level
of entrepreneurial activity (n∗E). Our model has two important project quality parameters: the
probability that an idea is good (γ), and, for a good idea, the probability of success (ρ).37 The
key difference between these two parameters is that the uncertainty about γ gets resolved prior
to financing, whereas the uncertainty around ρ only gets resolved after financing.
Consider first the case where γ is an increasing function of nE . In the low steady state equi-
librium, low values of γ discourage the demand but not the supply of capital. Specifically, on
the demand side a low value of γ discourages entry, because potential entrepreneurs realize that
it is rare to get a good project that is fundable. Yet on the supply side γ does not matter, because
investors have the ability of distinguish good from bad projects.38 Things are more complicated
when ρ is an increasing function of nE . Of particular note is the case of ρ(nE = 0) < φ/y, so
that all projects have negative expected returns in the low equilibrium. In this case it becomes
harder to escape the low equilibrium trap, because no foreign investor wants to invest. One way
out is a large government subsidy (SI) that absorbs all the losses from investing in ventures with
negative expected returns. Interestingly, a founding subsidy (SE) would not work at all in this
case. This is because even if a generous subsidy SE convinces entrepreneurs to enter, there are
no investors willing to finance their projects. Overall we note that ‘cross-sectional’ externalities
further reinforce the relative advantage of funding over founding policies.
4 Model Implications
4.1 Implications for Entrepreneurship Policy
This paper raises some fundamental questions about entrepreneurship policies. In this section
we discuss some of the broader implications. Our analysis emphasizes the dynamic aspect
of entrepreneurship policies, and the process by which ecosystems are built over time. This
approach contrasts with parts of the ecosystems literature which emphasizes the interaction be-
tween a diverse set of players, focusing on ‘cross-sectional’ rather than ‘longitudinal’ aspects
of ecosystem development (see also our discussion in Section 3.3). The cross-sectional liter-
ature focuses on the interplay between entrepreneurs, different types of investors, universities
and research labs, established corporations, stock markets, supply chains, service providers,
and so on. Our goal here is to add a dynamic component to the analysis. Specifically we argue
37The value of success y plays a similar role as the probability of success ρ.
38This observation would change if we added investor screening costs, i.e., if the evaluation of projects was
costly to investors. In this case, low values of γ would discourage investments in a way similar to low values of ρ.
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that some of the critical components of an entrepreneurial ecosystem can only be grown over
time. The underlying premise is that one of the required inputs for building entrepreneurial
ventures is a type of tacit knowledge that can only be acquired through direct experience of
the entrepreneurial process. The key novelty of our analysis is the intergenerational linkage:
the fact that younger generations of entrepreneurs benefit from the experience of previous gen-
erations, and the fact that over a career, individuals switch from being the key promoter (the
entrepreneur), to being a key input provider (the investor).
Our dynamic perspective of looking at the accumulation of expertise has immediate pol-
icy implications. First and foremost, any short-term evaluation of entrepreneurship policies is
fundamentally incomplete and possibly misguided. An evaluation of entrepreneurship policies
requires a long-term perspective, and needs to focus on the accumulation of experience as a key
metric. While this is immediately apparent in our model, we would argue that current prac-
tice is far off. Most entrepreneurship policies are measured either on the basis of how much
entrepreneurial activity they encourage, or how successful that activity is. Concretely, most
entrepreneurship programs are evaluated either in terms of direct inputs – how much money is
invested in how many companies – or direct outputs – how many companies succeed, and how
many jobs were created. Our dynamic perspective challenges these approaches by arguing that
a key metric for evaluating entrepreneurship policies is how much they add to the stock of accu-
mulated experience that can be leveraged by the next generation of entrepreneurs. Admittedly
this poses a significant measurement challenge, as it requires data about the career paths of the
individuals in the supported ventures, and how they contribute to the ecosystem after exiting
from these ventures.39
One interesting finding in our model is that even the simplest specification of intergenera-
tional linkages immediately generates multiple equilibria. This paper is by no means the first
to recognize the possibility of multiple equilibria in the market between entrepreneurs and in-
vestors (see Michelacci and Suarez (2004) and Landier (2006)). The novelty here is that the
multiplicity of equilibria does not stem from a standard coordination problem where one side
of the market needs the other side to do something; instead it comes from the dynamics of how
expertise is accumulated over time. To be precise, in our model there is actually a unique equi-
librium in every period, and therefore no coordination problem. However, there can be multiple
steady state equilibria to which the period equilibria converge to over time. Put differently, the
39To give an example, the full economic impact of PayPal concerns not only the company itself, but also the
so-called ‘PayPal mafia’ – the people that came out of PayPal, and became involved with companies as diverse as
Facebook, SpaceX, Airbnb, Uber, and others (see Forrest (2014)).
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challenge here is not to bring together different players to coordinate; the challenge here is to
dynamically build sufficient expertise for the ecosystem to become self-sustaining.
This multiple equilibria result suggests different roles for governments in more versus less
advanced ecosystems. In a high equilibrium there is a potential role for the government because
of a fundamental intertemporal externality: future generations benefit from the entrepreneurial
experiences of past generations. In a low equilibrium, there is an additional rationale for gov-
ernment support, namely to help the ecosystem move from the low to the high equilibrium.
In the model we show that this requires lifting the ecosystem to a minimum threshold of en-
trepreneurial activity, to set it onto a self-sustaining dynamic upwards path. This calls for
temporary government policies, where apart from the steady state logic of an intergenerational
externality, there is a temporary catalytic logic for entrepreneurship policies. A practical chal-
lenge is that policy makers would need to identify where such a critical threshold might lie, and
how to implement temporary policies that can be credibly phased out as the ecosystem moves
onto a self-sustaining path.
This paper looks at the trade-off between two canonical classes of entrepreneurship poli-
cies: founding and funding policies. We focus on these two policies because they represent two
important and distinct classes of entrepreneurship policies. Our model of founding subsidies is
a stylized depiction of a large set of ‘demand-side’ policies, i.e., policies that encourage more
entrepreneurial entry, and hence increase the ‘demand’ for capital. Across the globe there ex-
ist a large number of policies that encourage people to become entrepreneurs, consisting of a
variety of skills training and mentoring services. Closely related, there are numerous policies
for facilitating the initial steps of starting a business, such as business accelerators and incu-
bation facilities. Another broad class of policies that fit our model of founding subsidies are
commercialization grants that push technologies out of universities and other research institu-
tions into the market. We contrast these demand-side founding subsidies with funding policies
that encourage the supply of capital to entrepreneurial ventures. As discussed in Section 2.6,
our funding subsidy can also be understood in terms of a return subsidy, such as capital gains
holidays, or corporate income tax breaks. Despite its simplicity (or indeed because of it), our
model captures a large swath of entrepreneurship policies.
The finding that funding policies ultimately benefit entrepreneurs more than founding poli-
cies, is not immediately obvious. One might have expected that demand-side subsidies are
more favorable to entrepreneurs than supply-side subsidies, but this is why a proper equilibrium
model is needed. Our analysis reveals a new and ultimately very simple logic that founding
policies generate more entrepreneurs chasing money, whereas funding policies generate more
investors chasing deals (see also Gompers and Lerner (2000), Hellmann and Thiele (2014),
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Inderst and Müller (2004)). An interesting question concerns the boundary conditions of this
central result. What assumptions would be required for founding policies to become preferable
over funding policies?
In Section 3.2 we already conjectured that varying the number of periods that angels and
entrepreneurs can operate might reverse our main policy result, but actually found that this is
not the case. Another conjecture is that relaxing the assumption of non-monetary founding
subsidies might reverse our main result. In the Online Appendix we show that even if founding
subsidies were monetary, it would still be true that the wealth of successful entrepreneurs is
higher under a funding than a founding subsidy, so that again funding policies work better than
founding policies.40
All this suggests that on the benefit side, funding policies dominate founding policies under
most reasonable circumstances. However, the analysis so far assumes that the government faces
the same costs for both policies. Founding policies may well become preferable to funding
policies if they are cheaper to implement. This is ultimately an empirical question, but there
are some reasonable arguments as to why funding policies might sometimes be more expensive
than founding policies. For this we need to distinguish between two types of costs: program
costs, and misallocation costs.
First, there are program cost of delivering subsidies. Funding policies are monetary trans-
fers, so their costs include the monetary value of the subsidies, the government’s marginal
cost of funds (which takes into account distortionary costs of taxation), and the administrative
costs of dispensing the subsidies. By contrast, we think of founding policies as non-monetary
transfers. It is thus conceivable that a ‘perceived’ unit of subsidy has a lower cost for the gov-
ernment. This would happen, for example, if the government provides inexpensive training for
entrepreneurs that helps them to overcome exaggerated fears of starting a company. In model
terms, a unit reduction of the non-monetary entry barrier might cost the government less than a
unit of monetary subsidies.
Second, there are misallocation costs. The idea is that in addition to attracting legitimate
users, every subsidy also attracts some illegitimate users that somehow manage to satisfy the
formal requirements, but do not meet the intended economic purpose. For example, in addition
40The Online Appendix further explores another model variant where both founding and funding subsidies are
non-monetary. We show that under very special circumstances it is possible to obtain a reversal of our main policy
result. Specifically, we show that a non-monetary funding policy can be inferior to a non-monetary founding
policy, provided there are no intergenerational linkages, and provided angels can invest more than once (we show
this for the simplest possible case where angels can invest exactly twice). In principle one could think of policies
that encourage angel investments without providing any financing, such as free educational training for angels,
but in practice such policies are rare. Moreover, this result only shows that these peculiar non-monetary funding
subsidies are inferior. It still remains true that a monetary funding subsidy is superior to a founding subsidy.
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to being used for genuine start-ups, a funding subsidy might be used for dishonest ventures
that effectively tunnel the money away. We would argue that the problem of illegitimate users
is likely to be bigger with monetary than with non-monetary subsidies. This explains why a
cost argument, both in terms of program costs and misallocation costs, might reverse our core
finding that funding dominate founding policies.
4.2 Implications for Further Research
Our theory generates a host of new empirical predictions, and inspires interesting avenues for
further empirical research. We group our discussion into three themes: (i) the behavior of
entrepreneurial angels, (ii) the effect of entrepreneurship policies, and (iii) open ecosystem.
Our model highlights the importance of entrepreneurial experience for angel investing. This
invites a more systematic empirical investigation of the behaviors of these key individuals.
There is the question of who becomes an angel investor. Consider the set of founders, man-
agers, and key employees of successful ventures that have experienced a successful exit, be it
an acquisition or an IPO. The question is what do they do next? An empirical analysis might
look at the incidence and determinants of these individuals becoming angel investors, as well as
serial entrepreneurs (effectively investing in their own ventures). Also, our model looks at valu-
ations and tax credits as determinants of the propensity to make angel investments. An empirical
study could examine these and other important determinants of angel investing. The work of
Cumming et al. (2016) is an interesting step in this direction. A complementary approach is to
consider a representative sample of angel investors, and look at the behaviors of different types
of angels. Our model is based on the premise that prior entrepreneurial experience imbues angel
investors with useful tacit knowledge. This opens up new avenues for empirically investigating
how entrepreneurial angels differ from their non-entrepreneurial peers: Do they select differ-
ent types of companies, at different stages? Do they become more actively involved in these
companies, provide different advice, or make different decisions? And do they achieve better
investment outcomes?
Our analysis calls for further empirical studies of entrepreneurship policies. At the core of
our theory is a relative evaluation of alternative entrepreneurship policies. Currently the most
common type of empirical analyses of entrepreneurship policies concerns program evaluations,
which look at a single program in isolation and ask whether it achieves its objectives (see, for
example, Gans and Stern (2003), Hellmann and Schure (2010), Lerner (1999), or Zhao and
Ziedonis (2012)). However, our theory suggests a more ambitious empirical agenda. Beyond
individual program evaluations, policy makers need to think about policy design. This involves
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a relative comparison of the effects of alternative policies. Our analysis suggests that one of the
challenges here is that different policies are applied to different populations of firms, at different
stages of the entrepreneurial process. Another important challenge is that policies interact with
each other, prompting questions to what extent different policies complement or substitute each
other.
There is ample room for research on open ecosystems. A first set of questions relates to the
role of foreign investors. Some prior literature explores when venture capitalists invest abroad
and how (see Bottazzi et al. (2016), or Chemmanur et al. (2016)). The current model suggests
going one step further and asking how these foreign investments affect the development of
domestic ecosystems. A second set of empirical questions concerns brain drain. Surprisingly
little is known about this: Which entrepreneurs leave? Under what circumstances, and at what
stage? Where do they go? What effect does government policy have on their decisions?
Our model also opens up new avenues for further theoretical research. First, we believe that
while our analysis identifies two important classes of entrepreneurship policies, future research
could delve deeper into the details of these policies. Within each of our two policy categories
there are interesting nuances between different policies; and beyond our two categories, there
are many other entrepreneurship policies not considered here. Second, our analysis of intergen-
erational linkages focuses on one specific link, namely the transition of successful entrepreneurs
to become angel investors. Future research might consider additional intergenerational link-
ages, such as the role of failed entrepreneurs. Third, for tractability reasons our model has
obvious limitations, such as homogeneous venture opportunities of a fixed size, and a perfectly
competitive investment market. Relaxing those assumptions might generate additional insights,
including how different policies affect the level of competition in product and investment mar-
kets. Finally, a comprehensive formal analysis of open ecosystems remains beyond the scope
of this paper. Of particular interest would be a more comprehensive analysis that includes both
financial and human capital flows, thus also addressing the issue of entrepreneurial brain drain.
5 Conclusion
This paper builds a formal model of the market for financing entrepreneurial ventures, to ex-
amine the effects of two canonical entrepreneurship policies: founding policies that encourage
entry by entrepreneurs, and funding policies that encourage financing by investors. The model
recognizes the importance of tacit knowledge for investing in entrepreneurial ventures, and ar-
gues that this is mainly acquired through prior entrepreneurial experience. The supply of capital
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is therefore dependent on the wealth generated by prior generations of entrepreneurs. We show
that this has a profound influence on the market equilibrium, and the impact of entrepreneurship
policies.
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